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1
I. Introduction
In the history of philosophy and religious studies, there are few concepts so interesting,
so beguiling, and so often maligned as magic. Magic—as a concept, as a classification of
phenomena, and as a system of explanation—is most often ridiculed and used as a foil to show
the strengths of those systems which oppose it. In this thesis, I will argue that magical
phenomena, descriptions, and concepts are as valid within their rubric as are scientific
descriptions, concepts and investigations within theirs. The question, then, is not one of truth or
falsity, but of applicability to experience and consistency of description; the question is “if a
system of description yields consistent results from consistent inputs, then is that system not a
viable tool?” It is my contention that it is a viable tool, and that each system can be said to
accurately describe the world within the context to which it belongs.
Examining the writings of Edward James, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Clark Glymour,
Douglas Stalker, and Anthony Flew, I will investigate what I believe to be the two major
arguments against magic and the occult. From there I will move to a consideration what
constitutes “natural” and “rational” through the works of Antoine Faivre, James Frazer, Ariel
Glucklich and Carl Jung. The first group of authors provides a representation of the breadth and
depth of the philosophical and scientific argument against the occult, across roughly thirty years.
The second group provides a sampling of those who make an in-depth investigation into magic
and the occult, from several disciplines and perspectives. Finally, I will present an argument for
viewing magic as natural, taking aspects of and responses to each of the foregoing sections and
concluding that, if magic is a descriptive system unto itself, then it has its own rules and should
be judged by them rather than by the parameters of another system. While we may be able to
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compare the results obtained in any system with those of any other system, the systems are not
interchangeable and should not be treated as such.
As we will see, the idea of the natural is intrinsically connected to the idea of the rational
and so the two ideas must be considered together if we are to present a view of magic that fits
within the commonly accepted concept of nature. In this thesis, the natural and the rational will
be considered as separate topics, but there will necessarily be a certain amount of conceptual
bleed-over between the discussions.
Why argue for magic at all? Some will undoubtedly say that magic is simply a childish
misunderstanding of the nature of cause and effect, a primitive means of seeking to influence the
natural world by means which can have no efficacy whatsoever. I believe that magic is more
than this. Magic can be understood as a conceptual schema, using language, emotion, objective
observation, and subjective experience, and by which the magician may change both her
perception of the world and the perception of the world held by those around her. Though this
system is not interchangeable with science (and I am in no way making the case that it should be
seen as such), the understanding of this process demands attention to detail, consistency of
application, and immersion within the natural world, and it is for such an understanding that I
argue.
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II. Opposition to the Idea of Magical Phenomena as Natural or Rational
A. Findings in Philosophy of Science and the Occult: Against the Occult
The 1982 collection Philosophy of Science and the Occult, edited by Patrick Grim,
concerns itself with the ongoing discussion between sceptics, believers, and those ambivalent
with regard to what is often termed “occult phenomena.” 1 While a number of objections to belief
in the occult are raised, the concerns tend to fall into one of two major categories: 1) Occult
phenomena do not fit into rational discourse when placed under investigation, and so must be
removed from said discourse, or 2) Occult phenomena are or claim to be unnatural or
supernatural, and so are unable to be investigated by the methods of science. The phenomena
considered under the label of “occult” are varied, but there is a reason why they all can be placed
under a single heading. According to Grim, the term “occult” is used in reference to such things
as magic, astrology, parapsychology, alchemy, and even UFO phenomena because there exists
no other term “more suitably inclusive and yet unprejudicial.” 2 Using Grim’s inclusive
definition, I will explore a few authors to distinguish the major points in their critiques against
magic, and I will then focus on two views that I feel best exemplify the essence of the
opposition. 3 These authors’ arguments represent some the most important contemporary
objections to magic, and the Grim anthology remains the most important academic volume
addressing these themes.

1

Grim, Patrick, Philosophy of Science and the Occult, pg. 1-2, 1982.
Ibid, pg. 2.
3
It should be noted that the first piece in this book is the “Objections to Astrology: A Statement by 186 Leading
Scientists,” a famous missive delivered in the journal The Humanist, in 1975 (Grim, pg. 14-15). This is a five
paragraph statement reflecting the concerns of then-leading scientists that there are no rational reasons for
continuing to believe in astrology now that the distances and relative forces of the celestial bodies have been
accurately calculated, and understood. They do not, however, investigate the full implications of the study of
astrology on its own merits.
2
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B. The Occult as Irrational
1. James, Popper and Kuhn
Edward James seeks to establish criteria which must be met in order for a belief to
qualify as rational and to argue that belief in the occult—specifically astrology, due to its
reliance on other than purely scientific methods of explanation— fails to meet these criteria. 4
Invoking Thomas Kuhn, he suggests that these requirements are that a system seeks to find
reasonable falsifiers for itself, that it engage in the act of extrapolating its qualities to their
rational conclusions, and that it “solve puzzles.” 5 This last criteria, played out in the acts of
making more and more precise observations and calculations and describing the interactions of
the elements of a theory, is central to Kuhn’s account of rationality. 6 According to Kuhn, without
these activities the project is not rational and is therefore not useful.
In a parallel fashion, James writes that Karl Popper’s criteria of testability and
falsifiability are inapplicable for one of two reasons. The acts of falsification and testing, for
Popper, are what make a person or system rational, and astrology fails to attempt either.
Popper contends that the true test of a scientific system or explanation is the ability for it to be
falsified. 7 As he says in his 1953 lecture, “One can sum all this by saying that the criterion of the
scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.” 8 What Popper
means by this is that a system that disregards or simply subsumes arguments counter to its
position is unscientific and therefore untenable. If the system cannot possibly be falsified, then
anything can be fitted under its scope. The system cannot ever be said to fail, and need never be
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Ibid, pg. 24-32.
Ibid, pg. 29.
6
Ibid, pg. 25.
7
Ibid, pg. 87-93.
8
Ibid, pg. 91.
5
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revised. Popper believes astrology is such a system. 9 Popper’s view is indicative of a type of
objection to magical and occult phenomena and explanations in that it appeals to the criteria of
science and rationality to explain the whole of the phenomenological spectrum, thus begging the
question of whether those criteria will properly address every situation. As we will see, this
reliance on scientific processes to devise explanations and understandings is not always a
satisfactory technique.
Popper declares in his “Science: Conjectures and Refutations” that he believes science to
be distinguished from the pseudosciences by the difference between the truly empirical
methodology of science and the pseudo-empirical methodology of pseudoscience.10 The
difference, according to Popper, is that while the latter does make use of observational data and
experience, it “does not come up to scientific standards.” 11 This is because the popular
understanding of most scientific theories does not actually reflect the meaning and power of
those theories, and so they are applied improperly to the world. Laws concerning natural
phenomena, exemplified by theories such as relativity and Newtonian Motion, are indicated by
and indicative of rational processes, according to Popper, which means that they can be falsified,
tested, and augmented or discarded when they are found to fail. 12 Astrology merely encompasses
or enfolds all opposition, according to Popper, and does not actually engage in truly empirical
testing.
Popper breaks his ultimate conclusions down into the following seven points: 1) It is easy
to find verification for anything, if we look for verification; 2) Confirmations should only count
for “risky predictions,” or ones without which we would have expected some other result; 3)

9

Ibid, pg. 91.
Ibid, pg. 88.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid, pg. 90-91.
10
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“Every ‘good’ scientific theory is a prohibition,…The more a theory forbids, the better it is;” 4)
if a theory cannot be refuted by any conceivable event, then it is not a scientific theory; 5) Every
real test of a theory “is an attempt to falsify it;” 6) Confirming evidence should only count when
it is the result of a genuine failed attempt to falsify the theory; and 7) when found to be false, a
genuinely testable theory can be “saved” by the addition of an ad hoc explanation, but this is
done at the cost of lowering the scientific status of the theory. 13 With these seven principles,
Popper has simply more clearly explicated his stance that a theory is not scientific, is not a
genuine reflection of or investigation into the natural world, unless it is testable, refutable, or
falsifiable. 14
In the process of investigating these claims, Popper puts the Freudian theories of SuperEgo, Ego, and Id on the same footing as astrology, saying that without the ability to test and
observe the components, there is simply no way to know, at this point, whether those three parts
of the “human psyche” actually exist. 15 Simple inductive reasoning from past experience is not
enough for Popper, and must be augmented with predictions, falsification attempts and other
observational tests; without these, a system is not scientific and has nothing to say to the
scientific community.
While James agrees with Popper and Kuhn that astrology is not rational, he rejects their
specific arguments for this position. James’ first objection is to assert that the behaviours of
testing and falsification in fact are engaged in by astrologers, who seek to revise and account for
any failure they encounter in their system; specifically James points to the astrological theory of
“subsumption,” by which, for example, an incorrect horoscope calling for good fortune is

13

Ibid.
Ibid, pg. 91.
15
Ibid, pg. 92.
14
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subsumed under a correct horoscope calling for misfortune. 16 Hence “it was the horoscope of
Hiroshima that proved dominant during the waning days of World War II,” because while the
horoscopes of individuals may have forecast fortune and health, the horoscope for the city as
whole predicted doom and misfortune. 17 Secondly, if Popper means to say that all of astrology
fails to test itself or to seek falsification, James asserts that this is because astrology considers
itself a “discipline or area of study…and hence is no more to be falsified than physics or
astronomy.” 18 An entire system, to James, is not to be falsified or tested, and though he spends
little time on the subject, I believe that this distinction between disciplines or systems of thought
and the laws that arise within them is an important one and will be discussed at length in a later
chapter.
James gives much more attention to Kuhn’s concept of “puzzle solving,” ultimately
determining that though astrology and systems like it may not falsify or puzzle-solve using the
tools of rationality, they do perform these actions within their own methodology. 19 Astrology,
James writes, takes clear stock of its internal behaviours, and seeks to address any faults or flaws
that it finds, though not necessarily by the means of science. 20 Though this may not be
“rationality” as a scientific methodology would have it, James writes that the requirement of
calling these methods objectively irrational would require a much more in-depth investigation
than either Popper or Kuhn seems willing to perform. 21 If this is the case, James writes, then we
cannot validly attack the methods and systematic requirements of astrology, or any other occult
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Ibid, pg. 24.
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid, pg. 25.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
17
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phenomena, because we have not done the investigative work required to fully understand the
methods that we are proposing to disabuse.
That being said, James offers another type of argument against occult explanations, in
general, and astrology, in particular, which he feels rests upon the content of these systems,
rather than their methods. This argument, he claims, will help to keep the investigator from
simply quickly dismissing the system as “irrational” without proper consideration. 22
James develops an argument based on the content of astrology, showing each aspect of
astrology, as a system, to be attributable to human nature and experience, rather than any
supreme cosmic truth. According to James, the claims of astrology hinge upon a series of
dubious claims: 1) The influence that the position of the sun, at sunset, in a particular month had
on determining the time of the signs; 2) the inequal amount of time the sun spends in a given
constellation, necessitating the division of the heavens into the “signs of the zodiac;” 3) the fact
that the signs fluctuate, with the equinox moving backward one sign every 2,140 years; 4) the
fact that there is no account given as to why the stars so influence the lives of humans; 5) the fact
that, statistically speaking, every prediction of astrology can consistently be shown to be false. 23
And yet, he tells us, the dubiousness of these claims still does not show that astrology, as a
system, is “irrational;” instead it shows only that there are multiple interpretations of the data
available for review, which is a criticism that can be as easily levelled against a variety of
scientific tenets as against occult ones. What we really want to do, according to James, is make
certain that we never have to engage astrologers on “the issues,” as he calls them; we want to
make ludicrous the position of the occult explanation, and we have not yet found the means by

22
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Ibid.
Ibid, pg. 25-26.
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which to do it. 24 We have rejected Popper’s first, methodologically-based critique because “no
formula can portray (ir)rationality,” and we have rejected James’ content-based critique because
the difficulties for astrology, in that schema are of no different type than those that plague any
scientific discipline; fuller investigations of the content-based critique would seem to put the two
positions of astrology and science on the same level, and that is precisely what James says we
want to avoid. 25 So where does this leave us? We must try another critique until we can
completely roust astrological explanation, James writes, and this alternate critique is again based
upon methodology.
In James’ new attempt, we must not try to literally formulate the criteria necessary for
rationality, as Popper attempts. Rather we must look at the intricate act of reasoning, itself. 26
James believes that astrology attempts to qualify as a form of reasoning, but that it drastically
fails to qualify for the “rationality race” because it fails to exhibit the basic coherence and
puzzle-solving skills necessary for people to apply astrology as a tool. 27 James believes that as
we listen to the reasoning of the astrologers—though it may pain us to do so—we will realize
that what they have to say is to be rejected because it is plain, common, banal. 28 The astrologer,
according to James, is not doing anything new in terms of explanatory capability and is
committing basic errors of reasoning (a problem faced by any fledgling student of logic). 29
James gives us a list of four operational errors in the methodology of the astrologer.
Firstly, there are the basic logical fallacies, such as appeal to authority (relying on the
testimony of Johannes Kepler, in an area to which his authority as an astronomer does not

24

Ibid, pg. 27.
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid, pg. 30.
28
Ibid, pg. 27.
29
Ibid, pg. 27-28.
25
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necessarily apply), and vague analogy (“the structure of the atom is similar to that of the solar
system,” when, James notes, recent advances in quantum physics have shown this to be only
superficially true). He also sees astrology relying on “false cause,” as presented in the following
story: “On the day Queen Wilhelmena of the Netherlands married only one other woman in the
country was allowed to marry. She was a friend of the Queen, her name too was Wilhelmena,
and she was born on the same day as the Queen.” The false cause is evidenced when the
astrologer attributes this second marriage to the combination of name and date, rather than
merely to the Queen’s favor of her. 30
Secondly, James goes on to note that the explanations given by astrologers are “shallow,
not worthy of close attention,” meaning that they arbitrarily draw lines as to where astrology
should be applied without providing reasons for doing so, even after the fact. 31
Thirdly, writes James, even when interesting results in favour of astrology are presented,
there is no attempt by the astrological community to expand upon them. 32 Here, he references
Michael Gauquelin’s article “Spheres of Influence,” wherein Gauquelin finds an actual
correlation between the types of vocations chosen by people born at certain times in the
astrological calendar. 33 Instead of taking this substantial point and investigating it, the
astrological community closes the book and says “Astrology works; QED.” 34 No time is taken to
explore this correlation and, instead, the mere fact that there is any link at all is taken to prove a
nebulous “something.” 35

30

Ibid, pg. 28.
Ibid, pg. 28-29.
32
Ibid, pg. 29.
33
Cf. Gauquelin, Michael, “Spheres of Influence,” Grim, pg. 33.
34
Grim, Patrick, Philosophy of Science and the Occult, pg. 29.
35
Ibid.
31
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In describing the fourth and final error, James writes that astrology seeks to fill in too
much, in that it wants to offer specific pieces of advice in specific situations. 36 Astrology has
decided to claim that all coincidence must be a product of something more meaningful, more
fully explanatory, and that if we don’t see that, we are not looking hard enough. 37 But James
explains that what is actually shown by coincidences is recognition that we cannot explain
everything, that sometimes things just happen.
Exploring these four errors allows us the opportunity to investigate and address each
system of occult explanation, according to James, even though it means wading through things
that we know to be patently ridiculous. These are the demands of rationality, and we must seek
to meet them as fully as possible. In applying these criteria to astrology, however, we find that
astrology does not meet them; in fact it commits all four errors, and so is disqualified from the
realm of rationality. 38 Rationality, according to James, must be learned and practiced, and is not
a matter of something you “just know.” As such we must be careful about that which seems
rational, lest we allow into the discourse something which could cause us to seriously err in its
application.

2. Glymour and Stalker
“The Problem of Demarcation,” asks the question of where we draw the line between
scientific and pseudoscientific endeavours. In “Winning through Pseudoscience” (1982), Clark
Glymour and Douglas Stalker lay the “demarcation problem” out as resting at the line of
rigorousness, by which they mean that whatever is non-rigorous, is generalizing, or seeks overlyhard to explain flimsy premises necessarily counts as pseudoscience. Conversely, whatever does
36

Ibid.
Ibid.
38
Ibid, pg. 30.
37
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take the evidence at hand and investigates it seeking the best explanation, rather than the other
way around, is science. 39 Glymour and Stalker provide a list of six principles that characterize
pseudosciences, which we will discuss at length: 1) “A coincidence in the hand is worth two in
the bush;” 2) “A purpose to everything and everything to its purpose;” 3) “The taller the story,
the harder it falls;” 4) “Even physics isn’t all that precise;” 5) “Science is numbers and gauges;”
and 6) “Saying no to nit-pickers.” 40
The catchy sayings used by Glymour and Stalker to describe their understandings of
pseudoscientific thesis generation are actually rather thoughtful critiques of what they see as the
problem of pseudoscientific explanatory systems. The first principle, “A coincidence in the hand
is worth two in the bush,” refers to the idea that any coincidental happening can be used to make
a pseudoscientific system seem more legitimate.41 This is done, according to Glymour and
Stalker, by taking whatever correlations you wish to make and finding the coincidental situations
in which they both occur. If the pseudoscientist cannot find a pre-existing coincidental
relationship, he can then create one, using any common state of affairs; that is to say, by taking
some fact about the world, right now, and tracing far enough back in history, that fact becomes a
vast improbability, indicative of some grander meaning. “After all, what was the chance, eight
million years ago, that the universe would evolve so that you are wearing green socks, today?” 42
The title of the second principle, “A purpose to everything, and everything to its
purpose,” simply means that the pseudoscientist now must explain the facts that arise from the
work done with the first principle. Now that the pseudoscientist has found (or manufactured) the
coincidences necessary to get people thinking about the world in the correct way, he can show

39

Ibid, pg. 75-86.
Ibid, pg. 76-77.
41
Ibid, pg. 76.
42
Ibid.
40
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that these coincidences are now and have always been to the benefit of a grand cosmic design,
one that takes into account and cares for every individual. 43 He must connect each coincidence to
a purpose (“green socks signify great things,” as Glymour and Stalker write), but he must be
careful about how he chooses that purpose; to make sure that he chooses well, he should turn to
the third principle. 44
When Glymour and Stalker put forth “The taller the story, the harder it falls,” they mean
that an “aspiring” pseudoscientist will seek to create as wild a story as possible, not least because
that’s precisely what every other pseudoscientist seems to do, but also because it creates a larger
sphere of material with which to work. 45 If no one can disprove your claims as to the reasons that
the universe is ordered as it is, then no one can say that you are wrong, or that your explanations
are wrong.
The fourth principle, “Even physics isn’t all that precise,” is a basic appeal to the
ignorance of the general populace. The pseudoscientist here relies on the claim that no one truly
and fully understands the laws or nature of the universe and that, because of this, who can really
say that the pseudoscientific explanation is not the correct one? 46
If the pseudoscientist employs the fifth principle, however (“Science is numbers and
gauges”), the majority of people will be more inclined to give credence to the pseudoscientist, as
his system will be filled with official-sounding calculations that are still simple enough for
anyone to perform. 47 These calculations will most likely rely on some contraption as well as a
few simple mathematical operations, which will allow every user to really take a hands-on
approach to confirming the system. It seems that the more involved people can be with
43

Ibid.
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
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Ibid, pg. 77.
47
Ibid.
44
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understanding and finding (not steering, but finding) the path of their destiny, the more likely
they are to believe what the system tells them.
The final principle of pseudoscientific system generation is “Saying no to nit-pickers.”
This rule is for taking care of the inevitable criticism that will accumulate around the newly
created pseudoscience, such as offered counter-examples, attacks on the vagueness of the
system’s claims, or a lack of evidence. 48 This principle is composed of five tactics for
responding to these criticisms, including continually making distinctions and telling the person
who finds fault that they do not understand; referring to coincidental explanations when asked
for evidence; quoting well-known aphorisms (Glymour and Stalker use Emerson’s “foolish
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds”); discussing the philosophical nature of things like
the line between theory and practice and the necessity of belief to understand; and finally
counterattacking and claiming that much as other greats throughout history have been maligned
and misunderstood, so too is the pseudoscientist. 49 These final tactics, when combined with the
six preceding principles, will give the pseudoscientist an unassailable position from which to
build and operate the system.
These principles are designed to show that pseudosciences are built of nothing but sham
assertions and illogic, and Glymour and Stalker go on to build their own halfway-plausible mock
pseudoscientific systems out of them, taking great care to make the component contents as
meaningless as possible. There is not space to explore their fictional systems here, but it is worth
an independent read for anyone who is interested in the ways that people build meaning and find
patterns in things that may not necessarily contain them.

48
49

Ibid.
Ibid, pg. 77-78.
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C. The Occult as Unnatural
1. Flew on Causation
In Anthony Flew’s 1980 article, “Parapsychology: Science or Pseudoscience?”, he claims
that occult phenomena—embodied in this instance by parapsychology, the study of abilities such
as ESP or precognition—are untenable because they are simply not at all what they claim to be.
Flew assesses the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of the Claims of the Paranormal,
noting from the beginning that he wishes to distinguish parapsychology from the myriad other
phenomena under their purview, such as UFOs, the Bermuda Triangle, and astrology. He claims
that parapsychology is different because, unlike the rest of the studies where “we either know
from the beginning that it is all bunkum, or else we come to know this very soon after serious
and honest investigation has begun,” parapsychology has been investigated and studied by
scientifically rigorous people, with sound methodology, and no agenda. 50 In addition to the fact
that he does not believe it to be a new source of knowledge, there are three major distinguishing
points of parapsychology. For Flew: 1) it “has to be defined negatively;” 2) there is no way to
repeatably demonstrate the data supposedly under investigation; and 3) none of the
parapsychological theories are plausible in their explanations of the supposed phenomena. 51
Flew begins the investigation of the first point by noting that parapsychologists have
divided the field of psychic phenomena into two categories called psi-gamma and psi-kappa. 52
Psi-gamma is of the class of psychic phenomena that is represented by clairvoyance (“clear
seeing”) and telepathy (“distant feeling”), while psi-kappa is exemplified by psychokinesis
(“mind movment”). 53 He continues to define certain terms and concepts, saying that doing so

50

Ibid, pg. 178.
Ibid, pg. 179-180.
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Ibid, pg. 180.
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will allow the investigator to recognize that psi-gamma is nothing new. Flew’s first order of
business is to say that ESP is a meaningless term; there cannot be any such thing as an “extrasensory perception.” The very term is a hopeless contradiction. 54 Perception, Flew writes, is
necessarily mediated by the senses and so to say that a perception is “extra”—that is to say
“outside of” or “beyond” the senses—is to either confuse or misapply one or more of the terms
involved. 55 If parapsychology wishes to insist on this contradiction, writes Flew, then it is
“perverse to insist upon thinking of psi-gamma in terms of a perceptual model. It is almost
equally perverse to think of such information as constituting a kind of knowledge.” 56 Why would
we consider information not gained by the senses to be knowledge, when apprehension and
experience via some sensation is the only way we have of understanding the outside world?
We have just seen what psi-gamma claims not to be, according to Flew, i.e. it is not a
new kind of knowledge, it is not obtained by the senses, and it cannot be extrapolated from
knowledge of previous states of affairs. 57 Next we must turn to the second problem that Flew has
with parapsychology: “‘A phenomenon is, by definition, paranormal if and only if it contravenes
some fundamental and well-founded assumption of science.’” 58 Even if psi-gamma phenomena
do exist as somehow “extra-sensory,” we can only investigate their correspondence with the rest
of the world, and in fact to their supposedly foreknown situations, by means of the senses. 59 This
means that parapsychology, whatever else it might be, is not at all an independent source of
knowledge and understanding of the world and is instead merely an extension of existing
knowledge-gathering mechanisms. In addition to and in conjunction with this, when using the
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current methods of parapsychological testing, we have no way of determining which results are
due to ESP or clairvoyance and which are attributable to random chance. 60
Finally, though Flew makes it clear that he is concerned primarily with psi-gamma, he
uses the claims of psi-kappa phenomena (psychokinetic ability) to show that theories concerning
parapsychological phenomena are severely lacking. If psi-kappa phenomena were testable, says
Flew, then they would be testable in ways that would not allow for confusion between the
results, as in psi-gamma phenomena; all that would be needed are extremely sensitive measuring
devices in a shielded environment. 61 From here, he goes on to compare the preceding three
points to Hume’s criteria for miracles, saying that the impossibility of proving that miracles have
occurred is extremely similar to that of the reproduction of parapsychological results. 62 Hume’s
criteria state that for a miracle to be a miracle it must be a violation of the laws of nature by the
divine; thus, because the natural world has been repeatedly confirmed by experience, we have no
reason to accept any possible violation of it, nor could we prove it if we did. The fact that the
event happened means that it is consistent with nature. 63 But perhaps more important than any of
the foregoing points, Flew writes that parapsychological phenomena are unnatural because they
allegedly violate the laws of causation. 64 Standard causation dictates that an effect cannot
precede its cause, which is the fundamental assumption of extra-sensory perception.
These objections are of the sorts that drive against the idea of the occult, or magic being
natural phenomena, derived from the natural world. They can be seen within the same vein as
Popper’s argument on falsifiability, since all use the tools of rationality to discuss and defend
naturalness in the world. I would question these objections, however, asking if the case can’t be
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made that there is a rational, as well as a natural, way of arranging and describing the world that
is not necessarily scientific but is internally coherent. This question will be the focus of the rest
of this essay.

D. Conceptual Bleed-Over
As I earlier noted and as we have now come to understand, there is necessarily some
bleed over between the concepts of the natural and the rational as presented by the preceding
authors. It is generally assumed that that which is natural may be investigated by rational,
scientific means, and that that which is rational will have some foundation in the natural world.
That being said, we have also come to be aware of the possibility that Popper’s definition of
science as that which can be tested, refuted, and falsified does not cover all that may be
investigated by rational means. In the coming chapters, we will explore other means of rational
consideration than the purely scientific, and we will use them to make a case for a redefinition of
the concept of “natural.”
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III. Support for the Idea of Magical Phenomena as Natural and Rational
A. “Natural” and “Rational”
In this chapter, I will discuss support for the category of magic by means of the separate
but interrelated categories of natural and rational. What is “Natural?” What is “Rational?” In our
investigation thus far, we have not reached any clear definition of the term “natural,” though it
has been used implicitly to refer to that which is scientifically observable and testable. We have
said, in effect, that if something does not fit with the currently established laws of science, if it is
not logical, repeatable and testable, then it is not natural. In regards to “rational,” we have seen
internal consistency, repeatability, and correlation of a system’s results with the observable
world as the tests to be met. In this chapter, we will investigate four authors whose works most
clearly challenge these assumptions about the requirements for “naturalness” and “rationality”—
from whose writings can be seen emerging a new understanding of these ideas—and we will
seek to understand these authors’ arguments for their positions.

B. Magic as Natural
1. Faivre and the Theosophists
In his Access to Western Esotericism, Antoine Faivre describes the rise of the term magia
naturalis and its connection with the scientific method. According to Faivre, magic and science
both try to describe and explain the world in terms that allow those observing it to predict and
control its future behaviour. This is because magic and science were intrinsically connected in
the European Renaissance mind; they were seen as states through which man must pass, or types
of knowledge he must have in order to achieve salvation. More accurately, both science and
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magic were tools available to regain the state of perfection man had prior to “the Fall.” 65 Faivre
believes that magic is exemplified by “correspondences” between “all visible things and which
likewise unite the latter with invisible entities.” 66 This means that there is an “alikeness” among
things in nature which is unaccounted for by science, except to say that it is the way it is. Faivre
also mentions the modernizing of the contemporary esoteric movement, writing that those
currently involved in the study of esoterics are more willing to embrace modernity and the fields
of natural science. 67 This means that they will be more likely to approach the data and
experiments in ways that fit with science and with science’s definition of “natural.”
Faivre describes several different “paths” of inquiry on which the practitioner may travel
and designates this modernizing trend as belonging to the “Humanist Path.” The traveller along
this path seeks to understand the esoteric through what it means and symbolizes in relation to the
human psychology, and through investigation by human means (e.g. the sciences). 68 This would
seem to place Faivre squarely in the realm of the Jungian psychologist (Jung’s tenets consisting
of the interpretation of symbols and the application of that interpretation to the context of the
patient), but he denies this when he writes that there is a need to distinguish the esotericist’s call
to investigate archetypes from that of the anthropologist or the psychologist, effectively arguing
against the reducing of esotericism to other fields. 69 But Faivre is obviously finding use for the
terms of these other fields in his explication, and he goes on to speak of the Jungian Collective
Unconscious. 70
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As has been previously mentioned, Faivre spends some time discussing the tendency of
those individuals or groups of individuals on the humanist path of esotericism to accept and
incorporate modernity into their investigations. 71 Faivre discusses this as part of his methodology
of the occult and esoterics (the study of the “hidden” or “internal” paths), specifically concerning
the hermeneutics of this field of study. He writes that contemporary esotericists are using the
tools of the modern sciences to understand esoterics, prompting a return to the Naturphilosophie
of the theosophical societies. 72 That is to say that they are seeking a means of showing the
connection of nature, science, and the occult, or “magical,” similar to that of the theosophists.
“They are aware,” he writes, “that modernity is not free from danger, but they do not consider
that danger inevitable.” 73 This is an important distinction, because there have been many who
have considered the use of scientific tools to study the nature of magic, or vice-versa, to be an act
of unwarranted conflation; i.e. that those who would use both sets of tools are trying to say that
magic and science are interchangeable.
Though Faivre never names it as his referent, the idea of correspondence between certain
parts of the gross physical world (as well as parts of the hidden world) is an idea that is also seen
in the work of Sir James George Frazer in his seminal work The Golden Bough. Faivre does
note, however, that he sees the investigators on the humanist path as moving further along the
natural progression of Jung’s ideas of the collective unconscious, using the incorporation of the
natural sciences to “[confer] upon it a . . . dimension… of a transconsciousness branching out
upon an imaginal world.” 74 Both of these ideas will be discussed at length later in this essay.
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2. Glucklich and Phenomenology
In his book The End of Magic, Ariel Glucklich claims of the magical practices in
Banaras, India that not only do most believers in magic not consider their practices and beliefs to
be supernatural, but that the term “supernatural” can be considered meaningless. 75 Glucklich
states that most practitioners in Banares consider things like ghosts to be on a continuum with the
physical state of life, and that the scientific system has merely not come up with the means of
expressing their existence as yet. 76 They believe in magical practices, in the same way that you
believe in turning the key in your ignition to start your car: you are aware that there are steps and
intervening stages between what you do and what happens, but, for all intents and purposes, they
are one relationship: You turn the key, and your car starts; you perform the ritual and the effect
happens. 77
The above comparison is drawn in a purely phenomenological framework, looking at
what magic is, what it does, and what it means to those who practice it. Once understood, I
believe that this phenomenological mode can be applied to all human endeavours, describing
them as attempts to understand and engage the world in which we live as we find it represented
to us. This does not necessarily mean that all human endeavours are to be solely described in this
fashion; rather that this is one of many ways that human behaviour can be understood. Glucklich
takes the time to investigate the many academic approaches to magic over the years, and makes
it clear that he is taking Jung’s tactic—at least in part—in the investigation of magic. Jung
refused to “explain magic away.” 78 Whereas Freud sought to reduce magical experiences down
to explainable phenomena, or psychological traits, Jung simply approached said experiences on
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their own terms and sought to understand them within their contexts. Glucklich notes that,
through a recontextualization of magic, the field of “cultural anthropology” has begun to see
magic as a kind of language, a system of symbols to be interpreted, rather than as something to
be verified or falsified. 79
Glucklich investigates the progress of new scientific trends, including one called
psychoneuroimmunology, an area of behavioural medicine that “studies the effect of mental
factors on health and disease.” 80 In this field, research is done regarding the idea that the mind
can influence the immune system by means of the neural interactions in the brain. According to
Glucklich, the work that has been done shows that the immune system clearly responds to the
biochemical messengers of the brain, which in turn have been shown to be able to be stimulated
by the mental activity of the individual, depending on her emotional or psychological states. 81
This being the case, it is no surprise that it has taken a while for this kind of thought to catch on
in the medical community. Glucklich believes that the studies and results are pertinent to much
older practices, magical rituals that require the subject to adopt a proper mindset so that she may
combat the disease or ailment. 82 While it is a fact of evolutionary biology that animals will
naturally heal from most ailments, it is also true that there can be a correlation between reduced
healing times and the mindset of the individual.
Glucklich makes it plain that the clear-cut notions of causations dictated by the scientific
Enlightenment have become less concrete and more adaptable in the past century, beginning with
the work of James Clerk Maxwell and his investigation into the behaviour of
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electromagnetism. 83 These discoveries and theories cast a great deal of doubt upon the ideals of
Newtonian physics and their laws of certainty in motion and measurement. Now there was a
understanding of the universe that included probability and minute causal fluctuations and, later,
a built-in element of uncertainty, such that though we could know and measure one thing, it
would necessarily mean that we could not know or measure another. 84 In this way, quantum
mechanics came onto the scene, and became the new science of the day, by which many things
were explained. Glucklich’s question, however, becomes is magic thereby merely explained, or
is it explained away? 85
Glucklich next looks at a case study regarding magical or occult phenomena of bilocation and dematerialization, which have been explained as being a function of a different kind
of ordering of the universe—a division into “implicate” and “explicate” orders, as presented by
David Bohm. 86 The “implicate” order is defined as one in which the universe and all of its parts
are in contact and interaction with each other; in essence the implicate order holds that, when the
universe as a whole performs an operation on a larger scale, the effects of that operation appear
concurrently, but are not necessarily connected. 87 This is a contextual view of the operation of
the universe, resting on two types of understanding, but it is still not a complete understanding,
according to Glucklich. His point in studying the people of Banaras and coming to understand
their magical practices is to show that magic viewed from a phenomenological perspective
affords a much more complete and useful understanding than other perspectives which may be
more concerned with verification or testability. 88 Any object, writes Glucklich, can become a
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magical item, a talisman, or a sacred object. The key is not the object itself, but rather what that
object does and the context of meaning for the people for whom it does it. This pragmatic,
phenomenological view is not new; it has its deepest roots in the work of James Frazer and that
of Carl Jung. Their work with magic and the occult is concerned, primarily, with its rational
integration and understanding.

C. Magic as Rational
1. Frazer and the Principles of Sympathy and Contagion
In The Golden Bough, James Frazer writes that magic is an attempt to do the work of
science, but in a manner that seeks to override the generally perceived natural order. 89 Magic,
according to Frazer’s investigations, works on two principles: the principle of sympathy, wherein
an object B that is like an object A can affect object A; and the principle of contagion, wherein
an object B that has touched or previously been connected to an object A can affect object A. 90
From these two principles, Frazer believes that we can extrapolate all magical practice, and see it
as an attempt to influence the causal universe. For example, a rain ceremony, in which
participants drink water collected at the last rain and spit it onto the ground, would be magically
effective because the rain water being spat upon the ground is like the rain in that it both is water
and is falling to the ground, and it has been in contact with the thing the participants are trying to
affect, namely the sky and the rain clouds. These actions, combined with the correct words and
phrases at the correct times, will give rise to the desired result: a rain storm. 91
As noted above, the work done by the principles of contagion and sympathy are such that
the magician can seek to affect any area of the natural world. A rain dance and the ritual spilling
89
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of water are used to effect a rain storm; the combination of personal items and a simulacrum of a
particular individual are used to affect that individual, for good or ill; the growing of crops are
used as parts of rituals to promote human fertility; all of these things are able to be done by
means of sympathy and contagion. The state of the macrocosmic universe can affect the
microcosmic or human, and vice versa; this is exemplified in the principle “As above, so
below.” 92 What a magician does on the level of human interaction can, by dint of similarity in
structure and connection in type, affect the large-scale universe, and the form and movements of
the universe can, obviously, affect humanity. Though this is not what is normally considered to
be a scientifically quantifiable interaction, it can obviously be interpreted as a form of cause and
effect that can be correlated. Frazer’s system of inquiry took these into account and he argued
that the basis of all magic was an attempt to control these avenues of cause and effect, while
religion seeks only to fit into it. 93
Concerned with the magical practices of various tribes and cultures, Frazer relates each
practice for operations such as controlling rain, the sun, wind, and other forces of nature. 94 The
principles discussed here are specific to each culture Frazer investigates, indicative of the
meanings and symbols that the group associates with each aspect of the weather. For some
cultures, the rain may by symbolized by a snake in an arc, or by the blood of a bull hitting the
ground, depending on the symbolic meaning of those things in their cultural contexts. When
taken together, at the right places and times—which are also dictated by the sacredness of those
things to that particular people—the belief is that the rain will come. If the rain does not come,
then something must have been done wrong. In making use of a system of operation and
description, all that we can do is to attempt to predict and control results, and make adjustments
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in our operations if it fails. Though this analogy is an imperfect one, as we explore Carl Jung, we
will better understand that the levels of symbolism considered in religion and magic can take the
concepts of sympathy and contagion from a purely physical to a more symbolic and conceptual
one. We will also see that the new understandings of symbolism can contribute to making the
aforementioned predictions and adjustments as pertinent for the system of magic as it is for
science.

2. Jung and Pragmatism
In his 1938 Psychology and Religion, Jung says that the psychological value of religious
or magical experience rests not in its being true or false and not in its determining the nature of
the world for us, but in the work that it does in allowing us to function within society:
It is true that an overwhelming majority of educated people are fragmentary personalities
and have a lot of substitutes instead of the genuine goods…. What is usually and
generally called “religion” is… a substitute…. The substitution has the obvious purpose
of replacing immediate experience by a choice of suitable symbols invested in a solidly
organized dogma and ritual. 95
This means that we are not searching for truth or belief in religious or magical occurrences,
rather that we have to accept and appreciate the experience for what it is, regardless of the truth
value of the experience. Jung’s goal is the understanding that direct experience of reality is not
only unlikely, but potentially dangerous if attained. With direct experience, says Jung, we have
no reference point, no way to orient ourselves so that we may operate within the constructed
society, the collective reality around us. Without this orientation we are adrift and constantly
searching for something to adjust and complete us; this disorientation, according to Jung, is the
source of detrimental neuroses.
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According to Jung, to be a part of a religious tradition in a conscious capacity is to take
control of the application and adjustment of the drives toward individual integration into society,
in that one must recognize and mindfully seek to attain what is considered a “normal”
functioning of the psyche. That is to say that the act of becoming engaged in religious practices
is an act of consciously seeking to mediate one’s experiences and correctly fit with their society.
The unconscious stifling of these drives—which are used to fill the apparent deficits in a
personality—leads to the development of neurotic behaviour, because “if [an inferiority] is
repressed and isolated from consciousness, it never gets corrected. It is, moreover, liable to burst
forth in a moment of unawareness.” 96 If this happens often, then it is obvious that the persons
suffering these unwanted and erratic drives to seek completion will not be able to adapt to and
function in the world around them. If they cannot function in the world, then they are, in point of
fact, abnormal. Elsewhere, Jung makes it clear that the term “abnormal” is not a normative
distinction, that is to say, it is not a description designed to make a value judgment on an
individual. 97 Rather, “abnormal” simply means that which does not conform to the standard and
accepted rules of society. As such, something abnormal may be said to be “bad,” only within the
context of that secondary judgment.
We see that Jung’s conception of religious and magical phenomena is a pragmatic and
phenomenological one. It is not concerned with truth values or beliefs and is, instead, a question
of the experience of the believer or practitioner. As such we must ask, “what is the function of
this belief or practice” rather than “is this belief or practice true?” According to Jung, it is
meaningless to ask about the truth of an experience (as well as being outside the purview of
psychology), because an experience is neither true nor false; it simply is the experience. If this is
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the case, then the correct course of action is to seek to interpret the experience and to integrate
that experience into a normal societal functioning. We need not attempt to make a judgment
about someone who sees ghosts, or who has the experience of “feeling the Holy Spirit,” because
that judgment is without substance; it is secondary to the question of what those experiences
mean to that person, and what work they do in that person’s life. This new perspective is a part
of the process of recapitulation of the definitions of “natural” and “rational.”
This pragmatic reading of Jung allows the case for magical practices, experiences, and
descriptions to be made from another angle: If all experiences are filters through which we
interact with the world and the socially accepted rules therein, and if all of the experiences are
valid as experiences varying only in the degree to which we are able to adapt to and to find
meaning in the world through them, then magical experiences and descriptions of reality are
merely another view on the world, another system through which we can investigate reality. If
we can use magical experiences and descriptions in ways that allow us to continue to interact
with the world around us, then their usefulness is what matters. In magic, science, psychology,
and many other disciplines, we are using an artificially created lexicon to describe and interact
with the world around us, with nature. If there is a means of translation between the systems,
while keeping in mind the over-arching goal of each system, then conversations can be had and
investigations can be made between those systems and into the natural world. But what of the
idea that the description, itself, is the problem; what if magic as a system does not conform to the
socially constructed rules?
If we restrict the means of description or investigation, saying that one system is more or
less valid than another, while not taking into account the idea that each system may have
different applications, then we have missed a crucial point in Jung’s method. On Jung’s account,
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it is not a matter of there being rules to which we conform; it doesn’t matter the means by which
we become “normal,” just so long as those means achieve the end goal of normalcy. To make
“illegal” any of the means of dealing with the search for meaning and purpose, the integration of
self into the society, or the fundamental processes for healthily dealing with neuroses misses this
entirely. For Jung, a practice, experience, or belief is to be utilized for as long as it continues to
allow one to integrate into the society in which one finds oneself, and it is to be discarded as
soon as it ceases to do that work. As he says at the end of Psychology and Religion:
I must point out that there is no question of belief, but of experience. Religious
experience is absolute…. You can only say that you have never had such an experience,
and your opponent will say: “Sorry, I have.” And there your discussion will come to an
end. No matter what the world thinks about religious experience, the one who has it
possesses the great treasure of a thing that has provided him with a source of life,
meaning and beauty…. 98
And so an experience—be it religious, magical, occult, or otherwise—is neither true nor false; it
simply is.

D. Rational and Natural
If an experience can only be categorized in relation to the prevalent experiences of those
doing the experiencing, then no experience is rational. Instead what is rational is the act of
categorization, and only that insofar as it is an act of trying to fit the understanding of the
experience within the culturally accepted norms. In other words, categorizing is an act of
rationalization. If we self-consciously approach the systematization of experience, making sure
to maintain consistency throughout, then any such system may be shown to be rational within its
own context and limitations. Similarly, if “naturalness” concerns that which we can fit within our
understanding of the “natural world” and that which may have a place within the chain of cause
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and effect, then it can thus be seen that a continuum of ideas and actions may all be placed under
the heading of “natural.”
If we take the positions of Faivre, Glucklich, Frazer and Jung and explore the places
where their investigations overlap, then a picture begins to emerge for a different understanding
of magic and other “occult” phenomena or beliefs which may be used as a response to the
criticisms of James, Kuhn, Popper, Glymour, Stalker, and Flew. This understanding presents
magic as having all of the components of rationality and naturalness to make for an explanatory
system with specific lessons to be learned. In the next chapter, I will argue more fully for this
understanding, expanding on the materials and positions we have considered thus far.
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IV. Argument for Viewing Magic as Natural and Rational
A. What is the Argument for Magic?
Thus far we have described the issues and challenges facing the investigation of magic in
a academic context, not the least of which are the demand that it conform to the methods of
scientific investigation. We can now see that this view, in one important sense, begs the question
by assuming the supremacy of the scientific method. Science, like magic, psychology, or
philosophy, can be characterized as a system by which we seek to explain the nature of the
reality that we have around us. The supremacy of science is not guaranteed purely by its
consistency of result because, if we can qualify or quantify the informational inputs necessary to
use a system and determine results, we can get consistent outputs from any system. One problem
for our current time is that there is a reluctance to qualify or quantify the input variables
necessary to make these distinctions and determinations, precisely because they do not conform
to the requirements of objectively verifiable scientific process. The impact of belief on a system
is something that cannot be determined until we have a qualification for types of belief—group
belief, variance in individual belief, and so on—in terms of psychological constructs and symbol
systems. These may be shared across groups either consciously or unconsciously (as in the case
of Jung’s collective unconscious), but they will be understood in vastly different ways.
In order to have a clearer conception of the levels of interaction between the individual
and the world, the “subject” and the “object,” we must have a system that allows us to take as
many variables into account as possible, so that we may then correlate those variables with their
results. I believe that we take a step toward this type of system in what is traditionally called
magic. In magical systems, practices, and descriptions, we are concerned with form, function,
time, place, the state of the natural world in relation to the individual, the psychological structure

33
of the individual and any of a number of groups to which they belong, and the experiences that
follow there from. In a Jungian sense, there is nothing “supernatural” about magical practices or
experiences, as they follow from the strictures of a system of description concerned with the
entire scope of the natural world.

B. Types of Experience
In Jung’s collective unconscious, there is no ownership of the symbols and archetypes
available to the individual. In fact, by their very nature the symbols in the collective unconscious
are a reflexive combination of the symbols in the unconscious of all human beings. What this
means is that in the “collective unconscious” there are symbols and archetypes of meaning—the
tragic Hero, for example—that these are interpreted by every individual who encounters them,
and that their interpretation is put back out into the world, to be interpreted and understood by
those who encounter it, and on and on. 99 The individual has access to the collective unconscious,
not ownership of any part of it. When an individual accesses a store of collected knowledge and
understanding, she maps what she finds onto a correlative symbol or structure in her conscious or
unconscious mind. This is then modified by the experience of input, depending on time, place,
group, weather conditions, internal hormonal conditions, and any number of other factors of the
individual experiencer.
Here we see the nature of the interaction between the collective and individual stores of
knowledge, and how they influence and effect change within each other. That someone has
experienced something can not be disputed, as this is the purest form of private knowledge. The
actual experience is a thing that happens only to an individual and no matter how many people
claim to have an analogous experience, it will never be the same experience, nor can any other
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person truly be said to “know” that the other person knows. 100 To that end, we have no choice
but to believe that the reportage of the individual truly reflects their actual experience and, from
that point, we may seek to make sure that said experience does not prevent them from interacting
with the rest of the world. If the experience is detrimental, however, then we must seek to fix
whatever problems it causes. Does it then make more sense to try to cure a person’s problems
with ghosts by convincing that person that ghosts don’t exist, or by finding the symbols and
system that are known, within the context in which the individual is situated, to eradicate or
otherwise remove ghosts? If we address the problem in the context of the problem, Jung says, we
will achieve much more thorough and lasting results than if we try to deny the validity of the
context. 101
If we can systematize the nature and requirements of the experiences or private
knowledge of the experiencer, then she can better integrate her private knowledge with the
collected understanding of the public knowledge. This means that we must catalog the
circumstances of these magical experiences or phenomena and address their initial correlation
before we can test a system of causes and experiential effects. In other words, we must be willing
to investigate these phenomena on their own terms before we can develop a system that explains
them. Simply denying the efficacy of the system and claiming that it is an invalid representation
of the world presupposes the validity of the system used to judge. We cannot make judgments
across systems of understanding and description, but we can make comparisons of consistency
and usefulness of description. With that in mind, we must accept that there may not always be an
exact mapping of description across systems, and there will necessarily be things that are more
completely explained in one system than another. Again we come to the question of the
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preference for one system of explanation, one way or organizing our experience of the universe,
over another.
As has been noted, where we are concerned with science, we are most often concerned
with shared, public knowledge, and the methods of science are such that we achieve corroborated
measurements and correlations most often. But is this necessarily the case? Is it true, by nature of
the scientific method itself, that it will yield the best results of public knowledge most often? Or
is it only the case that once we have determined a definition, a direction in the search for
knowledge, we will more often than not privilege the information that corroborates it? The “open
source” nature of science, the very public nature of the public knowledge, allows for continual
investigation and corroboration that has been seen to lead to what Tim van Gelder has called
“confirmation bias.” 102 This is the tendency to seek corroboration only in support or
confirmation of one’s preconceptions, rather than in that which would disprove or challenge
them. Thomas Goetz has argued that the expectations of researchers have influenced publication
results for many years; results which may later be found to be outlying instances get published
because they are the expected results, not because they are the correct results. 103 These results
then get a great deal of attention, and all subsequent investigators are geared toward finding
evidence that corroborates and correlates what has already been shown.
Confirmation bias is a subtle thing in most experimentation, as researchers are trained to
watch themselves for it. In the case of things like magic and other so-called “occult” phenomena
and systems, we see that the confirmation bias is not simply found within a particular system, but
on a meta-level, when we seek to judge the worth or usefulness of an entire system. It is perhaps
best understood that there is no truly objective point from which we may judge the efficacy of a
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system, as we always engage in judging things from a position of a personal interpretation and
understanding of whatever we have accessed from the collective public knowledge. We can
become, at best, better aware of this process, but we cannot at any point escape it; no one learns
of or understands the world in a vacuum. At this point, we must accept that what we have in
terms of “objective knowledge” or judgment is necessarily infused with an individual,
“subjective” interpretation of the world, and that this is not necessarily a detrimental thing. Both
perspectives and sources of information are drawn from experience of the natural world, and are
parts of and influences upon each other.

C. Magic as a Natural By-Product of the Preceding Systems
As we have seen, we can look at each descriptive system as whole and inviolate; the only
judgment to be passed upon it concerns issues of consistency and correlation. No matter the
system to which we subscribe, we will find ourselves in the act of defining the state of nature and
experience. Our experiential world is that which we seek to describe and understand, regardless
of the instrumentation and definitions used to do so, and as such we are constantly dealing with
what is most natural to us. Our definition of natural will determine what we can discuss and in
what contexts we are able to operate because context is the true demarcating line in terms of the
applicability of a given system. That is to say, if my system is concerned with the context of
emotional meaning and interaction, then the concepts I use and their definitions will be very
different than those of mathematical descriptions of the world. This is because we are dealing
with what is a fundamental difference of concern, and while each system may seek to describe
the universe as it is experienced, the key context of each will be determined by the experience
and the preference of the person or persons generating it. This does not mean that we are unable
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to access contexts or systems other than our own, but rather that we must recognize that our
understanding will differ, because we are different, and that the experiential world is necessarily
one of a combination of subjectivity and objectivity. This means that the external expressions of
internal states will all be similar, due to having the same outer references, but that they will not
be the same, because the internal combinations of those references will result in different
associations between them references. We must modify our definitions of rationality and
naturalness, accordingly.
If we redefine nature as synonymous with “the universe” or “existence,” then everything
that exists in it exists as a part of it. This means that any system that we use to describe existence
will, if it is consistent, generate nothing but natural laws, as defined by the experience of the
universe filtered through a certain perception and experience. To clarify, the act of describing the
experience of existence will be influenced by that very particular experience, and thus every
definition will be slightly different if only in its further applications. This does not mean that one
definition must necessarily be correct, however, because an experience of a thing is not
something that can be modified; rather the meaning of the experience can change and can
influence future experiences and recollections of past ones, though never changing what
something was and meant at that time. If this is the case, then for anything to be “supernatural”
only makes it part of a larger nature, a particular interpretation and perceived meaning of a
specific definition of which the universe is, itself, a part. It is a shift in contextual understanding
rather than in objective “meaning” that we experience in the “supernatural” or the “occult.” This
means that the phenomenon in question—magic, in this case—is not supernatural, at all; it is
merely indicative of a more complex nature than previously understood. In using the descriptive
system of magic, we are making an attempt to describe our context in relation to the wider
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context of the universe and to describe that universal context in relation to context of existence.
The meaning of “universe,” then, comes to include ever-widening contexts, or perhaps contexts
that are simply differently related.
One contextual system need not encapsulate the same experiences and descriptions as all
others, because some of those experiences may quite literally be unimportant to the functioning
of any system. Though a case could (and perhaps should) be made for the generation of a
contextual system that seeks to constantly expand, or to reclassify and to recontextualize itself,
there is not enough time or space to address this issue here. Instead, we must be content to make
a case for re-examining the concept and system of magic as one which works within its own
context, while seeking to expand and deepen the understanding that magic can afford in regards
to the experiential world. If we begin with the assumption that everything that can be explained
can be explained by science, then we are not only taking for granted the idea that science is,
itself, a reliable tool for investigation, but also that it is a tool that will satisfactorily explain all
the phenomena with which it comes in contact. When we look at the scientific method and the
means by which it was devised, we see that there are certain assumptions that scientists agree
upon as a starting position. They agree that my words and your words for something mean the
same thing; that what I see, hear, feel, or smell matches what you see, hear, or smell. Scientists
have no guarantee of the truth of these assumptions, however, beyond the shared conceptual
experience of designating a term to reference an object and then sharing that reference. The
meanings and associations with these references, however, are not and cannot be shared because
no two people live the same single life. In magic, the combinations of references are perhaps
more nuanced, more subtle, but the goal is the same: Shared references towards shared ends.
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A simple but powerful example is that what I see or feel in discussing the sight and
texture of a tree may not phenomenologically match up with what you see or feel, but we have
shared expressions for them. “Brown,” “rough,” and “round” are concepts devised by human
beings to express certain sensations to other human beings, and we must simply assume that
what I mean by the terms matches what you mean. This agreement of reference is all that allows
us to operate within any shared system and demands that there be continual re-affirmation of
agreement with each new term that is introduced. This is what Roger Cooter means when he
writes, “all knowledge of external nature is made by men and socially constructed.” 104 In
addition to the socially constructed nature of knowledge and arbitrary lines of demarcation, we
have the concern that science may not satisfactorily explain everything that its proponents claim
it does.
As we have seen, Frazer’s treatment of magical practices is presented from a position of
disbelief. He simply seeks to describe the practices of those who do subscribe to magical
systems. The general arc of The Golden Bough moves from magic to religion to science, seeing
the latter as the ultimate manifestation of the description of and interaction with the natural
world, and the former two as flawed but understandable stops along the way. 105 While there can
be no doubt that a system of magical description or operation will be flawed and unable to
encompass or account for the entire spectrum of human experience of the natural world, this
criticism is no truer of magical theories than of scientific theories. A great many scientific
theories are flawed, requiring constant adjustment and investigation to match the way things
work in the “real world,” and yet even though they are neither fully understood (for nothing can
yet be said to be “fully understood”) nor fully reliable, we use them daily. The meteorologist
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who, based on “objective” data, determines that rain will fall and who subsequently enjoys a
week of constant sunshine, does not reject meteorology, on the whole, but merely assumes that
he did not have all the relevant information, and needs to perfect his theories and their
applications. More than this, science seems singularly inadequate in describing and capturing the
meaning of certain complex natural phenomena, such as love, beauty, and philosophy.
If we were to ask a practitioner of a magical system to give up her practice because her
input variables did not achieve the desired result, it would be analogous to asking a quantum
physicist to stop using quantum physics for the same reason. There are still a number of areas to
be investigated in which a magical system can be shown as natural, and one of the most
important of these is the area of phenomenological psychology. As we have seen, both Carl Jung
and Ariel Glucklich examine the idea of occult as defined through experience, rather than on a
basis of whether it is “true” or “false.” The key distinction is that an experience cannot be “true,”
it can only be an experience; by definition, it is something that happens to someone, or that
someone has. If this is the case, then occult or magical experiences, as a result of operations
within occult or magical systems, are not to be judged on criteria of truth or falsity, but on how
they enable the experiencer to interact with the world around them.
In his book I Am a Strange Loop, Douglas Hofstadter makes a distinction between levels
of description being useful for different contexts, and I believe that this can be applied laterally,
as well. 106 Though we may look at a purely scientific explanation for a phenomenon and find
that there is no lost information, that it can be mechanistically explained in terms of cause, we
cannot believe that this extremely narrow explanation will hold the same meaning. A
mechanistic explanation is not concerned with what an event “means,” or any potential
motivations of or influences on human agents involved. For instance, if we ask why a certain
106

Hofstadter, Douglas, I Am a Strange Loop, pg. 32-50, 2007.

41
building caught fire, or why it took so long for the Red Sox to win the World Series, a
description of the atomic level interactions that led to those events would not only be
astronomically long and tiresome, but it would miss the central point of the question. Obviously
the molecules of the materials in the burning building were excited to their frequency of
combustion, and the atoms of the players on the various teams of the Red Sox were in such a
configuration that they did not meet the condition “win,” but this is not the point. These answers
do not satisfy on this level; the questions must be approached on the level at which they were
asked. Why did the building catch fire? There was bad electrical wiring. Why did it take so long
for the Sox to win the Series? They lacked talent, or the psychological effects of being “cursed”
caused them to subtly sabotage themselves every year, or what have you. These are not “purely”
scientific explanations, and they do not fully explain all phenomena, but they are the
explanations that address the concerns of the question.
Again, the major objections presented in Philosophy of Science and the Occult tend to
fall into one of two distinct but interrelated categories. The first type—objections to the occult as
irrational—we see represented by Edward James, Clark Glymour and Douglas Stalker. The
second type—objections to the occult as unnatural—we see represented by Antony Flew, Karl
Popper, and J.B. Rhine. 107 (Of course, we have many people falling along some spectrum of
agreement and disagreement with all of these figures.) These two types of objections, while
distinct, are intertwined in that they both attempt to dismiss occult phenomena on the basis of a
set of presuppositions about the world by asking, “Are Occult Phenomena Rational/Scientific?”
On investigation, this criticism begs the question, because it assumes a rational/scientific
explanation for everything.
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D. Conceptual Analogies
Relativity does not reliably address the concerns of quantum mechanics, and psychology
does not adequately cover the phenomena of human biology. Literary criticism does not explain
chemistry. These systems are different contexts for meaningfully discussing different types of
phenomena and for demarcating types of cause and effect, such that we may better apprehend the
world. Magic may not be able to be explained in purely scientific terms (though we may find
some of the methods of science applicable). This is because it is a system which, though a part of
the same human conception of the universe and thus sharing many starting assumptions with
science, seeks to address different questions than does science. Magic is a distinct combination
of meaning, function, form, and interpretation, and as such it necessarily makes use of aspects of
almost all human endeavours (though some might claim that these endeavours grew out of, or at
least are concurrent with, magic). To ask that the descriptive system of magic conform to purely
scientific standards is as if to ask that a psychopharmacologist conform her findings to the rules
of sonnet composition.
There is no single context by which all explanations will reliably graft onto all others, but
even if there were such a context, then it would seem that scientific evaluations would no longer
be falsifiable. On the abstract level, science would have a framework through which to answer
any and all opposition. In this sense, Popper and other attackers of occult phenomena as
unscientific (i.e. “unnatural”) rest their argument on a myopic view of the nature of human
knowledge and understanding. When we look at the nature of the systems that we use to describe
the world, we see a set of common factors or goals that we seek to attain. While there may be
some debate as to the teleological or ontological nature of life and existence, there is little doubt
that explanatory systems are, themselves, purpose-driven. At the outset, we seek to explain some
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thing, rather than taking a pre-existing explanation for things and making the evidence fit. This
being the case, we find that the two main goals of the explanatory system of science can be said
to be consistency—rather than testability, falsifiability, and refutability—and rationality, as they
allow us to function and extend the existence of our lives.
Consistency allows scientists to rest in relative certainty with the knowledge that their
ideas about the future and the past are matching up and that, all else being equal, tomorrow will
be similar to today. For Hume and Jung, the mind seeks to integrate experiences and make them
into some kind of “norm.” Rationality—defined by science as the methodical and, of course,
consistent investigation of nature—offers us another step towards systematization by providing
an additional criterion for systems and their results to meet. Faivre evidences this position. The
thing to note here is that both of these criteria offer arbitrary points of orientation, points that
allow science to systematically approach the rest of the concepts that it is trying to describe and
define. From rationality and consistency science produces what we may call “objectivity,” as it
has drawn a clear line of demarcation, arbitrary though it may be, between the subject and the
object of study. Though this method affords us a means to describe our world, it is by no means
the only system available to us.
Every successful system that exists is founded upon the basic premise that our
correlational data is consistent. That is to say that when we input certain values for X, we can
repeatedly expect a certain observation Y. What inputs we have at X will vary from system to
system, but the basic computation will remain the same. The point of the systematic construct is
to allow us to frame and describe the world in a way that allows us to work within it and to
manipulate it for the purpose of our continued survival. If an over-arching system such as
“magic” uses inputs that include belief, ideological constructs and the configuration of the
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investigator/practitioner’s ideas about all of these things, as well as the gross physical, atomic,
sub-atomic, and biological processes with which the various branches of science concern
themselves, then the system will yield consistent results just so long as we take these factors into
account. We can see in the works of Carl Jung and the phenomenologists that there is a real
power and meaning to the combination of mental symbols that prompts the experiencer to
perceive the world in a way that allows her to take actions that reflect her mental state, thus, in
turn, changing the experiential quality of the world for any other observers of the event. What
matters here is that the mental and the physical are on a continuum of experience rather than
being unconnected dualities. The experience of nature, then, is the important thing, and the
description of that experience can take any number of forms.
As described above, with each new piece of information added into the system of magic,
we have to take more and more factors and combinations of time, place, meaning, interpretation
and belief into account. From this we extrapolate outward from a fundamental nonunderstanding of the world into a system that allows us, at the very least, to function in and to
describe the world consistently. That there may be multiple differences between this system and
any other is not something that should surprise or confound us, if we understand that each system
may function properly within its context. The question becomes, then, what is the nature of the
context in which each system functions? How do we delineate the edges of each context such
that we know when to apply each system? It is in answering these questions that we concern
ourselves with the observation of the data and the idea that belief may be an important input
variable. What we have, in terms of context, will be determined by what we are trying to
correlate and experience. If I am discussing the “objective” nature of the experiential universe,
then my requirements will be judged based upon shared and corroborated experience and
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observation. If, however, I am discussing the purely experiential nature of the universe in terms
of what I see, feel, believe, and what this then means for me, then my criteria for judgment are
relational to the other contents of my psyche and experience. Problems only arise when we try to
claim that one system can be used across all contexts.

E. Magic, Science, and the Natural: What is “Natural?”
Let it be perfectly clear that the assertion that magic and science are identical is not at all
what is under discussion. They are not. What key scholars who are investigating these practices
and phenomena are trying to state is not that in magical practices and the scientific method you
have two ways of saying the same thing, but rather that in science and magic you have two
different ways of investigating and approaching the same reality. So what is “Natural?” In the
traditions of many groups such as Wiccans, Native Americans, and Neo Pagans, “natural” is that
which comes from the Earth, untouched and untempered by human hands. But if we are to
restrict the definition of “Nature” so fully, then we may ask in response how something unnatural
can be made from components which are, themselves, only natural? Atom combinations and
molecular chains may be artificially constructed, but they are no more unnatural for that than is a
diamond. In each case, a series of external pressures and forces have taken base forms and
combinations, and made them into something other than they once were. How, then, is either of
them artificial? In much the same way, any system constituted by natural things and descriptions
of the various effects upon them cannot be said to be “unnatural,” and it most certainly cannot be
said to be above or outside of that which has created it. It is not, therefore, “supernatural.”
Magic, as a descriptive system, deals with the components of the universe and their
arrangement in ways that are comparable to, but not synonymous with, those of science. As a
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descriptive system, magic is concerned with different entities, terms, and units of measurement
than those of science. Though it could be said that they are describing the same reality, science
and magic are concerned with vastly different contexts. Whereas science claims to present an
objective, quantifiable reality, magic’s purview can be said to be that of the subjective quality of
reality. 108 Rather than utilizing such a sharp distinction, however, I would posit that each of the
two descriptive systems has elements of objectivity and subjectivity within it. That is to say,
every scientific description is made via a human being with a functioning perceptual apparatus,
the observations and interpretations of which will differ, if only slightly, from any other human
being. In the same vein, magical descriptions can be seen to be made on a shared collection of
subjective, individual experiences with agreed-upon definitions. As such, the resulting overlap of
these descriptive systems is imperfect, though necessarily similar.
Our investigation has concerned itself with the “natural world,” being the world of which
we are aware and on which we all agree—the world we seek to understand and apprehend. The
systems by which we do this may change, but the aim of the work is the same. Faivre notes that
Mircea Eliade wrote that myth travels between belief and knowledge, in order to assure “the
insertion of Man in every direction of space,” meaning that in every system we create, and every
pattern we define, we seek to find ourselves and our formulae. 109 This is not at all to say that
what we create is any less meaningful for being created; rather created meaning is the only type
of meaning that we have. We are necessarily unable to devise a system that can fully analyse
itself or the system that created it (meaning the human psyche and societies), so we must be
content to explore the contents of that system as fully as we can and to find some means of
operating more efficiently in the world, whatever we determine that efficiency to be.
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Magic, then, like the creation or practices of a psychology, a religion, a philosophy, a
history, a language, a system of mathematics (or the act of studying any of the above) is a
process of seeking to understand the world via belief, knowledge, and corroborating evidence. If
this is the case, then it may be said that the competing systems of investigation are, at the present
time, simply incapable of isomorphic comparison; that is that their observations and explanations
cannot be mapped onto one another on a 1:1 ratio. That this is the case need not be a stumbling
block, any more than it is to the students of philosophy and religion who recognize that there is
no one-to-one relationship between what their beliefs and thoughts mean to them and the systems
of mathematics and physics that seek to describe the world. In fact, there is no complete
correlation between any two systems unless they are specifically designed to be so compatible.
Magic, in the many forms in which that term is used and over-used, is simply another human
attempt to define and engage the world. As Glucklich notes, while the practices and experiences
of those engaged in magic are out of the ordinary, they are anything but “supernatural.” 110
Knowing this and having redefined our terms thusly, we may again look at magic as one
of a number of systems used to parse the world in which we operate, concerned not with inferior
or deficient explanations but with those explanations which are applicable to different kinds of
meaning. Magic is not to be disparaged as nonsensical, infantile misunderstandings of the nature
of cause and effect, but should instead be studied as a structure whereby the practitioner attempts
to categorize the interrelations between the self, language, the external world, and the people
within it. In so approaching magic, we may come to a better understanding not only of the
human drive for categorization and the relationship of “self” to “other,” but also of the evolution
of the meanings we ascribe the components of the natural and rational exercises. This
understanding then allows us to be more aware and mindful in all of our investigations as
110
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scholars. We are able to recognize more fully the types of questions we are asking and to
consider if those are the types of questions that can be meaningfully answered by the subject
under our investigation, or if we possibly need to re-evaluate the relationship between our system
of inquiry and description and the subject on which we bring that system to bear.
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